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CHRISTIAN MONOTHEISM) 
Linda Zagzebski 
In this paper I present an argument that there can be no more than one God in a way which 
allows me to give the doctrine ofthe Trinity logical priority over the attributes traditionally 
used in arguments for God's unicity. The argument that there is at most one God makes no 
assumptions about the particular attributes included in divinity. It uses only the Identity of 
Indiscemibles and a Principle of Plenitude. I then offer a theory on the relationship between 
individuals and kinds which allows me to offer an interpretation of the Trinity. 
1. A principle of identity and four kinds of properties 
Christians, of course, believe that there is but one God, and there are both philo-
sophical and religious defenses of this doctrine. On the philosophical side there are 
arguments such as those of Aquinas that certain attributes constitutive of the con-
cept of God could only apply to one being. These include self-existence, pure 
actuality, perfection, omnipotence, and simplicity. Each of these attributes can be 
used to generate an argument to the effect that it is not possible for more than one 
being to have such an attribute. In a recent paper William Wainwright has given 
very cogent and, in some cases, original arguments that monotheism is a necessary 
consequence of some of these attributes. 2 The defense of monotheism from the 
requirements of religion is also persuasive. Only one being could be the object 
of total devotion and worship. So even if God turns out not to be "the God of the 
philosophers" and lacks some of the traditional attributes, there is still good reason 
to think God wouldn't be God if he were not unique. 
Christian monotheism, unlike the Islamic and Judaic varieties, which have used 
similar arguments for the numerical oneness of God, includes another doctrine 
which constrains the way Christians can argue for monotheism. This is the doc-
trine of the Trinity. There is numerically one God, yet there are three Persons 
which are correctly called 'God.' This doctrine does not seem to sit well with some 
of the traditional monotheistic arguments such as the ones from aseity, from omni-
potence, and from simplicity. This is because these arguments are most naturally 
interpreted as showing not merely that at most one being can have an attribute such 
as simplicity, omnipotence, or aseity, but also that at most one person can have 
such an attribute. So, for example, the argument from omnipotence usually 
includes a premise to the effect that if two beings are numerically distinct and have 
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the capacity to will, then it is logically possible that there be a conflict in their 
wills. But presumably whatever reasons one has for such a principle would also 
be reasons for asserting the same principle with 'persons' substituted for 'beings.' 
In fact, Wainwright explicitly uses the term 'persons' in his argument from 
omnipotence.' I am not denying that simplicity, omnipotence, and aseity are 
attributes, in fact, essential attributes, of the divine nature, nor that there may 
be sound unicity arguments which begin with one or another of these attributes. 
My concern is not to refute any of these arguments, but to call attention to a 
methodological point for a Christian philosopher. If the Trinity is a much more 
important belief religiously than the premises of the unicity arguments mentioned 
above, then it is not a good idea to begin with such premises and worry later 
about accommodating the Trinity to their conclusions. Instead, it should be the 
other way around. 
Some would say that it is no wonder that the doctrine of the Trinity is not 
harmonious with the divine attributes since it is not harmonious with anything 
and that is why it is a mystery. But this seems to be too pessimistic. The Trinity 
is not flatly self-contradictory and there is no reason to shun the attempt to give 
an interpretive theory of it. In fact, it may even be important to do so. Therefore, 
I propose to give an argument for monotheism which makes as few assumptions 
as possible about the attributes included in divinity, which allows for an interpre-
tation of the Trinity which is logically prior to the arguments for particular 
attributes, and which consequently better reflects the relative importance of these 
beliefs in Christian theology. 
The argument for one God which I will give makes no particular assumptions 
about the attributes included in divinity. The argument in sections 2.1 and 2.2 
is general enough to apply to any natural kind of thing, not only divinity. The 
argument in section 2.3 makes an assumption about the semantical function of 
'divinity,' but no particular attribute is assumed to be included in divinity. The 
explanation of the Trinity in section 3 requires only the assumption that divinity 
includes absolute independence. 
My strategy will be to argue from the Identity of Indiscernibles and a Principle 
of Plenitude that two Gods could not be distinguished by their properties. Argu-
ments of this type are rejected by Wainwright in part II of "Monotheism." 
(l) The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles 
In every possible world let (J) be a variable ranging over complete sets H of 
the properties of an object in that world. For any property P, H contains either 
P or P (the complement of P). Assume the minimum restrictions on the properties 
in H to prevent triviality. 4 The principle can be formulated as follows: 
D (x) «(J) [0 (J)x -> ~ 0 (Ey) «(J)y & y 1= x)] 
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This principle says that if some object x has a certain complete set of properties 
in one world, there is no distinct object in any world with just that set of 
properties. Not only does no other actual object have exactly the same set of 
properties as this object, but it is not even possible that some other object have 
this same set of properties. Any object in any world which has these properties 
is this object. The properties uniquely identify the object. This principle is, of 
course, not uncontroversial. However, it seems to me to be true and also less 
problematic than premises which assert that God has one or another of the 
"philosophers' attributes." That God has some of these other attributes may be 
derivable from the argument I will give, but that is the topic of another paper. 
Before beginning the argument, I wish to distinguish four categories of prop-
erties: 
Contingent property = a property which is not necessarily instantiated, though 
it is instantiated in at least one world. 
Necessary property = a property which is instantiated in all possible worlds. 
Essential property of S = a property which an individual S has in all possible 
worlds in which Sexists. 
Accidental property of S = a property which is not essential to some individual 
S, but which S has in some possible world. 
We can also define the categories of essential and accidental properties simpliciter: 
An essential property = a property which is such that necessarily it is possessed 
essentially by any possible object which possesses it at all. 
An accidental property = a property which is possessed accidentally by any 
possible object which possesses it at all. 5 
Contingent properties mayor may not be accidental to whatever beings possess 
them. The property of being human, for example, is contingent but not accidental. 
The property of being a philosopher is both contingent and accidental to all the 
beings who are philosophers. If a necessary being has a contingent property, it 
is accidental to it. This is because in some world a contingent property is not 
instantiated. But since a necessary being exists in all worlds, there must be some 
world in which such a being exists but does not have the property in question. 
If a necessary being has an accidental property we would probably expect it to 
be contingent, but it may not be if there is some other being who possesses it. 
In fact, that other being would not even have to have it essentially so long as 
in every possible world some being has it (e.g. being the most powerful). So it 
is not clear whether there are necessary properties which are accidental to God. 
Later I will discuss this set of properties. Wainwright maintains without argument 
that all God's accidental properties must be contingent. 6 
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So there are four categories of properties for each S-necessary and essential to 
S, necessary and accidental to S, contingent and essential to S, and contingent and 
accidental to S. Since a necessary being can have no contingent essential property, 
there are at most three categories of properties as applied to a necessary being. 
2. Why there can be only one God. 
I will use 'God' not as a proper name, but as adescriptional designator applying 
to whatever being or beings are divine. The question, then, is whether two beings 
can be divine. I will argue that the answer is no, though a qualification about 
the status of internal essential relations leaves room for an interpretation of the 
doctrine of the Trinity. 
2.1. Why two Gods could not differ only in a contingent property. 
Any contingent property of a God would also have to be accidental to it since 
there are no contingent properties essential to a necessary being and I am assuming 
that any God is a necessary being. Wainwright says that he can see no reason 
to think two necessary beings couldn't be distinguished on the basis of a difference 
in contingent accidental properties. 7 However, I think there is an argument which 
does provide such a reason. Before presenting the argument, the logical connec-
tions between an object and its accidental properties should be made clear. I am 
assuming that what we mean by an accidental property entails the following 
principle: 
(2) First Principle of Plenitude (PPl) 
If some property PI is compatible with the set of essential properties E of an 
object 0, and if 0 has Pi in some world w, there is another world Wi in which 
o has PI and is as similar to w as is compatible with O's having PI in Wi. 
The intuition behind PPI is that every property which is compatible with the 
essence of an object is something it is possible for it to have. Furthermore, given 
some possible world in which it lacks that property, it is possible for it to possess 
it even though everything else remains as much the same as is logically possible. 
So the essence of an object alone sets the limits of the possible properties of 
that object. It is assumed, though, that the essential properties of an object 
include the necessary truths. So, for example, each object is essentially such 
that 2 +2 = 4, the Identity of Indiscernibles holds, etc. 
The same intuition allows us to form a parallel principle for pairs of objects 
as follows: 
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(3) Second Principle of Plenitude (PP2) 
If properties PI and P2 are respectively compatible with the set of essential 
properties E1 and E2 of objects 01 and 02 respectively, and if in some possible 
world w 01 has PI and 02 has P2, and 01 's having PI is compossible with 
02's having P2, then there is another possible world Wi in which 01 has PI 
and 02 has P2, and which is as similar to w as is compatible with 0 I 's having 
PI and 02's having P2, 
From (1), (3) and the hypothesis that two divine beings can differ only in a 
contingent accidental property and what is entailed by that difference, we can 
derive a contradiction as follows: 
I. Assume the principles of the Identity of Indiscemibles (II) and the Second 
Principle of Plenitude (PP2). 
2. Suppose that there is a world wI in which God 1 and God 2 have all 
necessary properties in common. They therefore have the same set of essential 
properties, and also the same set of necessary accidental properties, if there are 
any of this kind. They differ only in contingent property Cl. God I has Cl; 
God 2 has Cl. 
3. Since God I and God 2 have the same essence E, there is nothing in E 
which precludes God 2 from having CI and there is nothing in E which precludes 
God 1 from having C I. 
4. By PP2 there is another world w2 where God 2 has CI and God 1 has 
C 1, and w2 is as much like wI as is compatible with God 2' shaving C 1 and God 
I's having Cl. 
5. This contradicts II twice over. The complete set of properties HI which 
God 1 has in wI is possessed by God 2 in w2, and the complete set of properties 
H2 which God 2 has in wI is possessed by God 1 in w2. There is nothing which 
makes God 1 God 1 and God 2 God 2 if what is unique about each is something 
the other one could have had instead. 
6. The hypothesis that two divine beings can differ only in a contingent 
property and what is entailed by it is therefore false. 
By the same reasoning it can be shown that two Gods cannot differ only in 
some set of contingent accidental.properties. The reason is just that if any member 
of a set of properties is conting~nt,\so is the set. The argument is parallel to the 
ones above except that C I and Cl/stand for sets of contingent properties. 
2.2 Why two Gods cannot differ only in a necessary accidental property. 
It is not clear that it is possible for a property to be necessary but accidental 
to God. The only candidates that come to mind are comparative properties such 
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as being such that no other being is more powerful. If there is power in some 
world, there ought to be the greatest degree of it, though, of course it is an open 
question whether more than one being instantiates the greatest degree, and the 
same goes for benevolence, mercy and any other property that admits of degree. 
So there are candidates for properties that are instantiated in every possible 
world, but in different beings in different worlds. But why should every world 
have a most powerful being? It would have such a being only if power is 
necessarily instantiated. One reason power might be necessarily instantiated is 
if it is included or entailed by the essential properties of some necessary being. 
So then the putative property must be essential to at least one being. If it is 
essential to anyone, we would expect it to be essential to God, though this is 
probably not obvious. There is, though, at least some reasonable doubt that there 
is any property that is necessary but accidental to God. And if there is no such 
property, then, of course, there can be no question of two Gods differing in the 
possession of such a property. However, assuming that there is a property of 
this kind, we can still construct an argument parallel to the one in the last section 
for the conclusion that two Gods could not differ only in such a property and 
what is entailed by that difference: 
1. Assume II and PP2. 
2. Suppose that in world wI God I and God 2 have all essential properties 
in common and all contingent accidental properties in common. They differ only 
in necessary accidental property N 1. God I has N 1; God 2 has N 1. 
3. Since God I and God 2 have the same essence, God I is not precluded by his 
essence from having Nl, noris God 2 precluded by his essence from having NI. 
4. By PP2 there is another possible world w2 in which God I has NT and God 2 
has NI, and which is as much like wI as is compatible with God I's having NI and 
God 2's having Nl. 
5. But this contradicts II twice over. The complete set of properties HI which 
God I has in wi is possessed by God 2 in w2, and the complete set of properties 
H2 which God 2 has in wI is possessed by God I in w2. 
6. Therefore, two divine beings cannot differ only in a necessary accidental 
property and what is entailed by that difference. 
By the same reasoning two Gods cannot differ in some set of necessary 
accidental properties. The argument is exactly parallel to the one above except 
that NI and NI stand for sets of necessary accidental properties. 
Therefore, though it is not clear that there are any necessary accidental prop-
erties, if there are, God I and God 2 cannot differ in those properties alone since 
the supposition that they do violates the two principles I have proposed, a 
principle of identity and a principle of plenitude. 
In addition, a parallel argument can be used to show that two Gods cannot 
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differ in any combination of contingent and necessary accidental properties. Any 
difference of accidental properties would lead to the consequence that there exists 
a world in which God 1 has exactly the same set of properties as those possessed 
by God 2 in some other world. But by the foregoing argument this is impossible. 
Therefore, since God 1 and God 2 cannot differ in any set of contingent or 
necessary accidental properties, they cannot differ merely in accidental properties 
at all. 
If the argument in this and the previous sections are right, they show not only 
that two Gods cannot differ only in accidental properties, but that no two beings 
of any sort can differ only in accidental properties. No two individual objects 
can share exactly the same set of essential properties. There are, therefore, 
individual essences. The implications of this consequence for metaphysics are 
interesting and I have examined them elsewhere,8 but for the purposes of this 
paper I wish to concentrate only on its application to a divine being. 
So if there are two Gods, they must differ in some essential property. Since 
by hypothesis both Gods are divine, if there are two Gods, one has an essential 
property which is not part of the divine essence which the other one lacks. The 
next section will propose an argument that this is not possible. 
2.3. Why two Gods cannot differ in an essential property. 
Wainwright says, "It is not clear why two necessary beings could not be 
distinguished by a difference in their essential properties, that is, it is not clear 
why two necessary beings must have the same essential properties. Indeed, if 
the doctrine of the Trinity is coherent, the thesis is false."9 In this section I will 
try to show why two divine necessary beings cannot be distinguished by their 
essential properties, though in section 3 an exception will be made for essential 
internal relations, the properties which distinguish the members of the Trinity 
from each other. I will then give an interpretation of the relation between objects 
and their properties which does not preclude the persons of the Trinity from 
being numerically one being. 
The argument that two Gods could not differ in an essential property rests on 
a particular view of the function of the concept of divinity. It seems clear that 
we have a variety of ways of referring to a God, either directly or by description. 
When we use the name 'God' we may mean to refer directly to the being those 
in our religious community worship, or we may mean to refer indirectly to 
whatever being or beings have some attribute or attributes we are considering 
such as omnipotence, omniscience, or perfection. The concept of divinity, 
though, is used when we wish to refer to the nature of such a being or beings, 
and when it is asked whether there can be two Gods or two divine beings what 
is meant is whether two beings can share such a nature. Divinity. then. can refer 
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to either the nature of the being those in our religious community worship, picked 
out by a direct reference, or alternatively, it can refer indirectly to the nature of 
whatever being or beings has some particular attributes. 
I will argue that 'divinity' must refer to the complete nature of such a being. 
Divinity includes the complete set of properties essential to any divine being. 
so even though we may sometimes fix the reference of 'God' by such descriptions 
as 'the being we worship' or 'the absolutely perfect creator of the universe,' we 
use 'divinity' to refer to the whole nature of such a being. I have two arguments 
for this claim. One appeals to the way the term is actually used, while the other 
is purely theoretical. 
Consider first some features of the ways 'divinity' and 'God' are actually 
used. Sometimes 'God' refers directly to a particular individual whom we come 
to know by revelation or the religious experience of our faith community. Call 
such an individual 'Yahweh.' Suppose we come to believe that Yahweh is 
essentially good. If it were possible for Yahweh to have essential properties 
which are not included in divinity, then we would expect there to be a theological 
debate over the question of whether goodness is included in the properties which 
constitute divinity or whether it is essential only to Yahweh. But we do not have 
such a debate. In practice, if some property P is taken to be essential to Yahweh 
that is ipso Jacto assumed to be sufficient to show it is essential to (any) God. 
The same observation holds for those uses of 'God' in which 'God' is taken 
to refer indirectly to whatever being or beings have some particular attribute 
such as absolute perfection, omnipotence, or independence. If it is discovered 
through some argument that such a being must have some other essential attribute, 
say omniscience, this attribute also is taken to be constitutive of divinity. In 
fact, it seems to me that this procedure and the one mentioned in the previous 
paragraph are two important ways we find out what properties are contained in 
divinity. It seems, then, that our usage of 'God' and 'divinity' supports my 
position. Though there have been discussion in which it was taken to be an open 
question whether Yahweh's possession of some essential property P is necessary 
for P's being a divine attribute, it is almost always taken to be sufficient. Divinity, 
then, includes all the essential properties of a particular divine being. If follows 
that no two divine beings can differ in an essential property. 
The second argument for this position is theoretical. It seems plausible that 
the existence of individual essential differences among members of a natural 
kind indicate that such individuals fall short of the perfection of the kind. Suppose, 
for example, that humanity is a proper subset of the essential properties of 
individual humans; that is, humans possess individual essences. This suggests 
that no individual human possesses the whole of humanity. Contained in the 
identity of each is a way of being human which is not possessed by any other. 
If a being were essentially everything a human could be there would only be 
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one human. The same point can be made even if the idea of individual essences 
is unacceptable. All we need do is switch the discussion to higher-order natural 
kinds such as the kind Rational Creature. It is reasonable to think of Rational 
Creature as a higher-level kind under which the kinds Angel and Human fall. 
But the fact that there are properties constitutive of being human and hence, 
essential to individual humans which are distinct from some of the properties 
essential to angels suggests that neither the kind Human not the kind Angel 
exhausts the kind Rational Creature. Only one set of essential properties could 
exhaust the kind Rational Creature, so if more than one perfectly rational creature 
existed, they would have the same set of essential properties. 
If divinity can be considered a natural kind by analogy with the kind Rational 
Creature, and if it is assumed that any divine being contains the whole of divinity, 
or is perfectly divine, this means that two divine beings could not differ in an 
essential property. Since it was shown in the previous section that two divine 
beings could not differ in an accidental property, it follows that two divine beings 
could not differ at all. Therefore, by the Identity of Indiscernibles, there is only 
one God. 
3. The Trinity 
The proper use of reason in placing the doctrine of the Trinity within a general 
metaphysical interpretation of such concepts as essence, attribute, person, and 
numerical identity is a difficult and sensitive issue. It seems to me, though, that 
Aquinas was right in saying that what we can expect from reason in a discussion 
and defense of the Trinity is quite different from what we can expect from reason 
in an argument for the unicity of God. To put it briefly, for the latter we can 
expect fairly cogent direct arguments, whereas for the former we can hope only 
for a coherent explanation. lo In this section it will be necessary to assume that 
the attribute of absolute independence is included in divinity. 
In attempting an explanation of the Trinity I will present a theory on the 
relationship between individuals and their properties. This theory will be used 
to suggest a criterion for distinctness between individual beings which allows 
for a unique case in which numerically identical beings differ in some essential 
internal relations. 
3.1. The distinction between an attribute, which is expressed by a simple, one-
place predicate, and the general category of properties. 
What I call a simple one-place predicate stands for a property which is non-rela-
tional in two senses. First, it does not purport to relate the object to another 
object, and second, it does not purport to relate the object to a moment or 
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moments of time. I call the first sense in which a predicate can be relational 
object-relational (reI.,), and the second sense time-relational (rel t ). 
Let us define the notions of non-relo and non-relt as follows: 
To say that a predicate (J) is non-relo is to say that for any x, the result 
of predicating (J) of x does not entail the existence of any object that is 
not entailed by saying of x that it exists. 
To say that a predicate (J) is non-relt is to say that necessarily for any 
x, if the result of predicating (J) of x is true at one moment of time, it 
is true at every moment of time at which x exists. 
When I say that R entails S I mean that it is impossible in the broadly logical 
or metaphysical sense for R to be true and S to be false. If R entails S then the 
truth of R depends upon the truth of S. 
We can define the notion of a simple one-place predicate as follows: 
A predicate (J) is a simple one-place predicate <-> (J) is non-rei", is 
non-rel t , and is simple in structure. Let us call the property expressed 
by a simple one-place predicate an attribute. 
To have a simple structure would ordinarily mean that it is a single word. Such 
a predicate cannot have a complex structure, nor can it be an abbreviation of an 
expression with a complex structure. Predicates that are non-reI" and non-rel t 
would include 'human,' 'water,' 'daffodil,' 'is either awake or asleep,' and 'is 
such that if it doesn't exist, then it exists. ' With the criterion of simplicity added, 
the last two examples would be excluded. The criterion of simplicity is intended 
to remove contrived properties, Boolean combinations of other properties which 
intuitively are not what was intended by the classical notion of a property (e.g. 
being either a fish or a worm). 
Examples of predicates that are non-relo but rel t are 'blue,' 'asleep,' 'tadpole,' 
and 'is either angry or frightened.' Examples of predicates that are relo but 
non-rel t are 'carnivorous' and 'was born after Christ.' Predicates that are both 
relo and relt include 'philosopher,' 'squash player,' and 'is decorated with flow-
ers.' 'Mother' is reI" and has two senses, one rel t , one not. The first is the sense 
in which we say that a woman becomes a mother only when her child is born. 
The second is the sense in which we call a woman the mother of someone 
timelessly. 
It is my position that the category of predicates I have just defined pick out 
what we intuitively consider to be natural kind terms, though it is not important 
for the purposes of this paper to insist on this point. The paradigm cases of 
natural kind terms fit this category. Some questionable ones such as artifact 
terms may also fit it, though I do not believe any clearly non-natural kind terms 
are simple one-place predicates in mv sense. In the case of a contin!!ent temporal 
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object we usually think that either it falls under a unique natural kind or that if 
it falls under more than one, they are related as species and genus. On my view 
it is possible for an object to fall under more than one natural kind when the 
definition of the kind includes a set of distinct properties. Each of those properties 
is an attribute and would in tum define a natural kind. So each of us primarily 
falls under the natural kind Human Being, but if such a kind includes both 
rationality and temporality as defining characteristics, we would also fall under 
the natural kind Rational Being, as well as the kind Temporal Being. So when 
an object falls under more than one natural kind, they are connected by relations 
of entailment from one primary kind. To be human entails that one is an animal, 
and it entails that one is a rational being. 
Contingent objects will include in the class of their attributes those which 
relate the object to other objects without which the object cannot exist. This is 
because no contingent object is purely independent. Consider some particular 
daffodil. For this daffodil to exist certain other things must exist as a matter of 
physical necessity-earth, air, water, light, and so on. Perhaps this particular 
earth, air, water, and sunlight is not necessary, but certainly something is which 
provides for the plant what these things provide. What this plant needs as a 
matter of logical necessity is much more difficult to answer. It seems that we 
could imagine a possible world in which daffodils grow without water, light, 
and so on, but perhaps it would be incorrect to call them daffodils, but only 
something 'like' daffodils. A stronger case could be made for the claim that a 
given daffodil could not exist, i.e., it is logically impossible that it exist, unless 
matter of a certain kind existed. Many philosophers would even say that the 
particular matter of which this daffodil is composed is logically necessary to it. 
It could not exist without it. So a given daffodil cannot exist unless other things 
of certain kinds exist, and its existence may even be dependent upon the existence 
of other particulars such as other daffodils, this matter, etc. In each case predi-
cating the natural kind term 'daffodil' of a daffodil entails the existence of 
other objects. But it does not entail the existence of any object not entailed by 
the de re predication of existence to the daffodil. 'Daffodil,' therefore, is non-relo ' 
Furthermore, each contingent object, including, of course, each of us, cannot 
exist without God. This means that to say of me that I exist entails the existence 
of that being without whom I could not exist. So all contingent objects have 
relationality built into them. Their one-place predicates express this. Again on 
my view essential relations, i.e. relations which an object has in every world in 
which it exists such as 'is created by God,' express properties which are non-relo ' 
God also has attributes in the technical sense I have defined. Many of the 
traditional attributes would probably qualify as attributes in my sense as well, 
though some of them might not. If objects of knowledge exist apart from God, 
and if omniscience entails the existence of such objects, then God's omniscience 
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is not an attribute in my sense, though God could still be omniscient. Being the 
creator would not be an attribute, though omnipotence, goodness, simplicity, 
freedom, immutability, and impassibility, would all be candidates. (The last four 
are probably actually second-order attributes, or attributes of attributes.) 
Unlike the attributes of all other beings, the predication of an attribute of God 
does not entail the existence of any distinct object at all. It does not entail the 
existence of any contingent object. Furthermore, it does not entail the existence 
of a distinct necessary object. God's non-relational properties cannot entail the 
existence of any distinct being because that is to say it is impossible for God to 
exist without that other being and that would make God dependent, contrary to 
the assumption of this section. So none of God's attributes entail the existence 
of anything but God. Since the predication of attributes to God entails the 
existence of necessary objects such as numbers, it follows that such necessary 
objects are not distinct form God. 
God is therefore unique among all other beings, including all other necessary 
beings. The predication of attributes to any being other than God entails the 
existence of something distinct from that being, and in every case it entails the 
existence of God. God is , of course, more than a number, so to say the existence 
of numbers entails the existence of God is to say the existence of numbers entails 
the existence of something distinct from, or more precisely, something over and 
above, themselves. But to say the existence of God entails the existence of 
numbers is not to say the existence of God entails the existence of anything 
distinct from or over and above himself. I am not proposing any particular theory 
on the nature of necessary objects other than God and the way in which they 
depend upon God's nature. It is natural to think of them as objects in his mind 
or something of the sort, but I am suggesting only that they are not independent 
beings; they are not distinct from God himself. 
3.2. Relational properties in the divinity 
Relational properties can be either internal or external. Call the set of attributes 
of some object A (f). Let us define an internal relation of A as a relation which 
does not entail the existence of anything other than an object which possesses 
(f). So relations to other beings in the same natural kind are internal relations in 
my sense. An external relation of A is a relation which entails the existence of 
an object which possesses some properties not contained in (f). It was argued in 
section 2.3 that two Gods could not differ in their essential properties and that 
would include, presumably, any essential relations. But the distinction just drawn 
between internal and external essential relations has an interesting consequence 
when applied to God. 
Let us review some of the important differences between the way God is 
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related to his properties and we are related to ours. First of all, none of God's 
attributes entail the existence of any distinct being, whereas our attributes, and 
the attributes of all contingent beings, do. This follows immediately from the 
notion that divinity entails complete independence, and created or contingent 
beings entail dependence. This feature of the relation between God and his 
attributes distinguishes him not only from beings that are contingent in the sense 
of existing in only some possible worlds, but it also distinguishes him from other 
necessary beings. Beings like numbers are necessary in the sense that they exist 
in all possible worlds, but they are nevertheless dependent beings which owe 
their existence to God and are not distinct from God. 
Another difference in the relation between God and his attributes and the 
relation between us and our attributes is that two contingent objects A and B 
can share one-place properties, but the existence of A entails the existence of 
different objects that are entailed by the existence of B. These differences in 
entailment generate criteria of distinctness between the different members of the 
kind. So each daffodil entails the existence of different particulars, though the 
relation between each daffodil and the particulars its existence entails is formally 
the same since they are in the same natural kind. In the case of God, however, 
no other particular is entailed by God's existence. Therefore, there can be no 
distinction between one God and another on the basis of different entailments. 
Different members of an ordinary natural kind will be alike in their attributes, 
though each attribute when applied to a particular member of the kind will entail 
the existence of different particulars. This leads to the conclusion that different 
members of the same natural kind have different essential external relations 
(relations to things outside the kind). In God, however, there are no essential 
external relations. 
In the case of ordinary natural kinds, the members of the kind differ in their 
internal relations as well (their relations to other members of the kind). But it 
can never happen that two contingent objects which are members of the same 
natural kind and hence have the same attributes differ only in their essential 
internal relations. They will always differ as well in their essential external 
relations. For this reason, the criterion of distinctness for individual beings which 
belong to the same natural kind and hence have the same attributes, is difference 
of essential external relations. We can use this to formulate a criterion of distinct-
ness for individual objects: 
Criterion of Object Distinctness 
If object a and object b belong to the same natural kind, then if a is distinct 
from b, there exists some relation R and object x outside the natural kind to 
which a and b belong, such that aRx and - bRx. 
On this criterion for distinctness between individuals with the same attributes, 
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there can be only one God and the different members of the Trinity are numerically 
one individual being. On the other hand, the fact that they differ in internal 
essential relations means that there is some important difference of individual 
being. The tradition, of course, calls it a difference of person since the only 
differences between the members of the Trinity are person-like characteristics. II 
Could there be other internal essential relations between the members of the 
Trinity in which they differ other than the ones which are traditionally used to 
distinguish Father, Son, and Holy Spirit? I cannot think of any reason of logic 
which would prevent such a possibility, though perhaps the lack of such a 
distinction might be argued from the Principle of Sufficient Reason. In any case, 
I think it reasonable to say that we get our concept of identity for individuals 
from contingent objects or other dependent beings, and on this concept, differ-
ences in internal essential relations do not by themselves give a difference of 
object identity, though they obviously give a difference of identity in some other 
sense. This other sense is what is intended by the distinction within the Trinity. 
Though the persons of the Trinity do not differ in essential external relations, 
they will differ in accidental external relations. For example, the accidental 
property of being prayed to by Anselm may be a property of the Father, not the 
Son. This would be the case if Anselm prays to the Father qua Father, i.e. his 
intentional state is essentially connected to his perception of God as having that 
property which distinguishes him from the Son. If the Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit differ in some essential relational properties, then they will also differ in 
some accidental relational properties. This is not a problem, though, since acci-
dental relational properties do not figure in the identity of a being. The only 
problematic ones are the essential relational properties, and I have argued that 
these are important enough to give a difference of person, though not of numerical 
being. 
I concluded from the discussion in sections 2.1 and 2.2 that two Gods cannot 
differ in an accidental property, whether contingent or necessary. In section 2.3 
I argued that two Gods could not differ in an essential property. Hence, by the 
principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, there can be only one God. In section 
3 I presented a theory of things and kinds which, when combined with the 
assumption that God is absolutely independent of all other beings, allows us to 
conclude that in the single case of divinity, being A can have exactly the same 
essential external relations as being B, and hence, be numerically identical with 
B, though A and B differ in essential internal relations. The identity of A and 
B, therefore, differs in some sense of identity. It is plausible to call this a 
difference of persons. I conclude that though in a plausible sense of being there 
is at most one divine being, the Trinity is not contrary to reason. 
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10. Aquinas writes: 
Reason may be employed in two ways to establish a point: firstly, for the purpose of furnishing 
sufficient proof of some principle, as in natural science, where sufficient proof can be brought to 
show that the movement of the heavens is always of uniform velocity. Reason is employed in another 
way, not as furnishing a sufficient proof of a principle, but as confirming an already established 
principle, by showing the congruity of its results, as in astrology the theory of eccentrics and epicycles 
is considered as established, because thereby the sensible appearances of the heavenly movements 
can be explained; not, however. as if this proof were sufficient, forasmuch as some other theory 
might explain them. In the first way we can prove that God is one, and the like. In the second way, 
reasons avail to prove the Trinity; as when assumed to be true, such reasons confirm it. 
We must not, however, think that the Trinity of persons is adequately proved by such reasons. 
(ST Z 32, Art I, Reply Obj. 2) 
II. As Aquinas expresses it: 
Therefore person in any nature signifies what is distinct in that nature; thus in human nature it 
signifies this flesh, these bones, and this soul, which are the individuating principles of a man, and 
which, though not belonging to person in general, nevertheless do belong to the meaning of a 
particular human person, 
Now distinction in god is only by relation of origin, as stated above (Q 28, A 2, 3) while relation 
in God is not as an accident in a subject, but is the divine essence itself; and so is subsistent, for 
the divine essence subsists, (ST Pt. I, Q29, Art 4). 
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Now as there is no quantity of God, for He is great without quantity, as Augustine says (De Trin. 
i I) it follows that a real relation in God can be based only on action. Such relations are not based 
on the actions of God according to any extrinsic procession, forasmuch as the relations of God to 
creatures are not real in Him. Hence, it follows that real relations in God can be understood only 
in regard to those actions according to which there are internal, and not external, processions in 
God. These processions are two only, as above expounded, one derived from the action of the 
intellect, the procession of the Word; and the other from the action of the will, the procession of 
love. (Q 28, Art 4, pt. 1) 
